USS Leader (MSO 490) during Desert Storm

The minesweepers USS Impervious (MSO 449), USS Adroit (MSO 503), USS Leader (MSO 490), and the MCM ship USS Avenger arrived in the theater 30 September on the Dutch heavy-lift ship Super Servant III. USS Adroit and USS Impervious were Naval Reserve Force minesweepers, which deployed to the Gulf augmented by Reserve crews. On 7 October, the six MH-53E AMCM helicopters arrived by USAF C-5A airlift. USS Tripoli (LPH 10), which had been part of the amphibious task force, was assigned to the USMCMG as a support ship for the AMCM helicopters and as the USMCMG command ship. The USMC landing force disembarked and off loaded its equipment as the USMCMG staff embarked in USS Tripoli on 22 January. In addition, two UAE-flagged vessels, Vivi and Celina, were contracted as support ships for EOD teams that accompanied the USMCMG. These forces, along with the EOD teams, formed the USMCMG, based in Abu Dhabi, UAE.

18 February 1991, While sweeping further toward shore, the task group was targeted by Iraqi fire control radars associated with Silkworm missile sites inside Kuwait. Task force ships moved out of Silkworm range and worked to locate the radar site. During those maneuvers, Iraqi mines found their mark. Within three hours of each other, Tripoli and USS Princeton (CG 59) were rocked by exploding mines. As damage control teams successfully overcame flres and flooding aboard Tripoli and Princeton, minesweepers Impervious, Leader and Avenger searched for additional mines in the area. Adroit led the salvage tug USS Beaufort (ATS 2) toward Princeton to tow her to safety.

16 March 1991, Naval forces continue counter air-defensive, combat air patrols and minesweeping operations. Marine forces maintain defensive positions. 81 crewmembers of the minesweeper USS LEADER (MSO 490), whose minesweeping efforts enabled the battleships USS MISSOURI and USS WISCONSIN to safely transit mine-infested waters for close-in gunfire support, return from six-month deployment in the Arabian Gulf to NAVBASE Charleston SC. Ship remains overseas, manned by crew of minesweeper USS EXULTANT (MSO 441), as part of crew rotation policy for minesweepers.

25 March 1991, Naval forces continue counter air-defensive, combat air patrols, maritime interception and minesweeping operations. While actively sweeping for mines in the Arabian Gulf, the minesweeper USS LEADER (MSO-490) deployed its magnetic acoustic influence combination sweep which detonated a suspected mine approximately 600 yards behind the ship. No injuries, crankshaft cracked in the #1 main propulsion unit. Ship continued mission, then proceeded to Bahrain shipyard under its own power for scheduled maintenance.

In addition to the US MCM assets, two other NATO countries and Saudi Arabia provided SMCM ships during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The Royal Navy provided the most SMCM assets to the Coalition MCM effort. The UK initially deployed the Hunt Class mine hunters HMS Atherstone (M 38), HMS Cattistock (M31), and HMS Hurworth (M 39), along with the support ship HMS Herald (AGSH 138). Later, the mine hunters HMS Ledbury (M 30) and HMS Dulverton (M35) joined the MCM force. This UK MCM group operated closely with the USMCMG in clearing Iraqi mines in the northern Persian Gulf during Operation Desert Storm. Belgium contributed two Tripartite class mine hunters, Iris (M 920) and Myosotis (M 922), plus the support ship Zinnia (A 961). The Belgian MCM group operated mostly in the Gulf of Oman. Saudi Arabia's MCM ships included the minesweepers Addriyah (MSC 412), Al Quysumah (MSC 414), Al -Wadi'ah (MSC 416), and Safwa (MSC 418).

The SMCM and AMCM assets were responsible for clearing areas with water depths greater than 10 meters. The Coalition's MCM force provided the ability to survey the Persian Gulf open water areas, port approaches, harbors, potential amphibious objective areas, and sea lines of communication. The MCM force also had the ability to detect and counter all types of Iraqi bottom and moored mines.

MCM Operations

Before the start of Operation Desert Storm, the US ability to gather intelligence on Iraqi minefield locations, or observe and counter Iraqi minelaying activity in international waters (considered a hostile act under international law) was degraded by restrictions on naval and air operations in the northern Persian Gulf. To avoid any possibility of provoking Iraqi military action before Coalition defensive and later offensive preparations were complete, CINCCENT restricted naval surface forces in the Gulf to operating south of the 27 degrees 30'N parallel (approximately 72 miles south of the Kuwaiti-Saudi border) until early January Similar restrictions kept the flight paths of aircraft south of 27 degrees 45'N (approximately 55 miles south of the Kuwaiti-Saudi border) unless tactically required to exceed that limit. Those restrictions precluded gathering intelligence on Iraqi mining activity and also prevented NAVCENT from acting to deter or counter Iraqi forces from setting mines adrift in the Gulf.

After the RSNF discovered the first drifting mine in December, the USMCMG found and destroyed six drifting mines before Operation Desert Storm started. On 24 January, the USMCMG left Abu Dhabi and conducted training and maintenance while enroute to its designated MCM operating area in the northern Persian Gulf. On 14 February, the oceanographic survey vessel HMS Herald and five Royal Navy mine hunters joined the USMCMG. This task force started its MCM operations on 16 February, 60 miles east of the Kuwaiti coast, working initially to clear a 15-mile long, 1,000 yard wide path to a 10-mile by 3.5-mile FSA south of Faylaka Island.

While sweeping toward the shore of Faylaka Island on 17 February, the MCM force was targeted by Iraqi Silkworm antiship missile fire control radars in Kuwait. The ships moved out of the missile's range while Coalition forces located and attacked the radar site. With the Silkworm missile threat diminished, the MCM forces began to move back to the previous minesweeping areas at 0240 on 18 February. At 0435, after operating for 11 hours in an undetected Iraqi minefield, USS Tripoli hit a moored contact mine in 30 meters of water. The explosion ripped a 16 foot by 20 foot hole below the water line. As USS Avenger and USS Leader attempted to assist the damaged warship, USS Princeton (CG 59), while unknowingly heading along a line of Manta mines, continued to provide air defense for the MCM Group. At 0715, USS Princeton actuated a Manta mine in 16 meters of water. A sympathetic actuation of another mine about 350 yards from USS Princeton occurred about three seconds later. These mine blasts caused substantial damage to USS Princeton, including a cracked superstructure, severe deck buckling, and a damaged propeller shaft and rudder. As damage control teams overcame fires and flooding aboard USS Tripoli and USS Princeton, the minesweepers USS Impervious, USS Leader, and USS Avenger searched for additional mines in the area. The minesweeper USS Adroit led the salvage ship USS Beaufort (ATS 2) toward USS Princeton; USS Beaufort then towed the damaged warship to safety.

USS Princeton restored her TLAM strike and Aegis AAW capabilities within two hours of the mine strike and reassumed duties as the local AAW commander, providing air defense for the Coalition MCM group for 30 additional hours until relieved. USS Tripoli was able to continue her mission for several days before being relieved by USS Lasalle (AGF 3) and USS New Orleans (LPH 11). The amphibious assault ship USS New Orleans detached from the ATF and provided the flight deck for AMCM helicopters while the USMCMG staff moved aboard USS Lasalle to continue coordinating the mine clearing operations. USS Tripoli then proceeded to Bahrain for repair.

Charts and intelligence captured from Iraqi forces showed the minefield where USS Tripoli and USS Princeton were hit was one of six in a 150-mile arc from Faylaka Island to the Saudi-Kuwaiti border. Within the arc, there were four additional mine lines, with more than 1,000 mines laid before Operation Desert Storm began.

The initial intelligence assessment, based on limited knowledge of Iraqi minelaying operations and on observations of the transit of an Iraqi merchant ship through the area, was that the Iraqis had placed their minefields closer to the coast. AS a result, Coalition MCM forces initially passed through the outermost minefield and started MCM operations near a second barrier of bottom mines. The USS Tripoli and USS Princeton incidents proved the initial assumption incorrect. The Coalition forces revised the MCM plan, extended the transit lanes 24 miles to the east, moved the MCM and NGFS task groups back out of the Iraqi minefield to unmined areas, and then resumed MCM operations.

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USS Princeton Mine Incident
SPECIAL NOTE

Commanding Officer, USS Princeton - "The ship was steaming slowly, barely maintaining steerage way in order to allow maximum reaction time if a mine was spotted. I had just told the crew that we had to be especially cautious and be on the lookout for mines because Tripoli had been hit just hours earlier. Just as I made that comment, the force of the mine explosion under the stern lifted up the ship and caused a whiplash. We on the bridge were moving up and down rapidly. We all grabbed on to something and tried to maintain our footing...My immediate reaction was that we had hit a mine. But the fact that the ship continued this violent motion for more than a second or two concerned me. I didn't expect the violent motion to continue as long as it did. At this point, both the Boatswain's Mate-of-the-Watch and I sounded General Quarters."

Two seconds after the mine exploded under the stern another mine exploded about 300 yards off the starboard bow. The combined effect of these two mines ripped the ship's superstructure in two at the amidships quarterdeck.

"My first reaction was to notify someone else that we had struck a mine. We had to keep the ship from sinking. Another immediate reaction was that this was what we had been preparing for months. I had total confidence that my crew would do the right thing - that they would do what they had been trained to do."

"The first report that came in was about the injured people on the forecastle. Petty Officer...was already there giving flrst aid to Petty Officer...who was the most seriously injured. Petty Officer...was standing right at the bullnose looking for mines when the blast went off under the stern. Petty Officer...was thrown 10 feet into the air."

Near the ship's stern, where the most serious damage occurred, the firemain ruptured and doused an electrical distribution switchboard, causing a major electrical fire hazard. The switchboard was remotely isolated after the rupture was reported to Damage Control Central. The mine blasts also ruptured fuel tanks, forcing damage control parties to work in a mixture of fuel and water. Automatic sprinklers near the after 5-inch gun mount activated which aggravated the ship's flooding problem. The crew installed and activated dewatering systems within 10 minutes of the explosions and thus reduced the danger of both fire and flooding.

Loss of cooling water to electronic equipment, due to ruptured pipin disabled the ship's combat systems. Damage control teams quickly isolated the ruptures and immediately began emergency repairs to the cooling water systems.

"Within two hours the combat systems and combat information center teams had their equipment back on line with the forward gun and missile systems ready to shoot Princeton reassumed duties as the local AAW commander and did not relinquish those duties until relieved by USS Valley Forge."

"As the day wore on I was concerned about drifting around in the mine field. So I made the decision to have the salvage ship, USS Beaufort, take us in tow, since our maneuverability was not good. Once under way, we moved slowly west with the minesweeper, USS Adroit, leading us, searching for mines. USS Beaufort continued to twist and turn, pulling us around the mines located by USS Adroit and marked by flares. Throughout the night, USS Adroit continued to lay flares. Near early morning, having run out of flares, she began marking the mines with chem-lights tied together. The teamwork of USS Adroit and USS Beaufort was superb."

"I felt the life of my ship and my men were in the hands of this small minesweeper's commanding officer and his crew. I directed USS Adroit to stay with us. I trusted him and I didn't want to let him go until I was clear of the danger area. All of us on USS Princeton owe a big debt to the officers and crew of USS Beaufort and USS Adroit. They were real pros."

On 27 February, USSAvenger, using the AN/SQQ-32 MCM sonar, detected, classified and marked a bottom influence mine similar to the type that had struck USS Princeton - the first bottom influence mine ever found intact during combat. Divers from EOD Mobile Unit 6 placed neutralizing charges and detonated the mine.

After the cease-fire, MCM assets from Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the Netherlands joined the MCM group. This MCM force swept paths to Kuwait's ports and completed Persian Gulf mine clearing operations by 10 September 1991.

Impact of Iraq's Mine Warfare

Although the Iraqi minefields were not placed to maximize their effectiveness and many mines were deployed improperly, mine warfare had a considerable effect on Coalition maritime operations in the Persian Gulf. Kuwait's relatively short coastline, combined with the large Iraqi mine inventory, caused the Coalition MCM forces to plan and conduct MCM operations in support of an amphibious landing through dense minefields while vulnerable to missile, artillery, and small boat attacks from fortified beaches. Considering hydrographic and operational characteristics, an amphibious landing probably could only occur between Kuwait City and Ras Al-Qul'ayah, along 30 miles of coastline.

Many deployed mines lacked sensors or batteries which prevented their proper operation. During MCM operations, 95 percent of the UDM-type acoustic influence mines were evaluated as inoperable. Several moored contact mines were recovered on the bottom and apparently 13 percent of the moored mines broke away from their moorings. However, even the poorly planned and improperly deployed minefields caused damage to two combatants and were one of several reasons the amphibious invasion was not conducted. (Other factors, such as collateral damage to Kuwait's infrastructure, risks to the landing force, and lack of a MARCENT requirement for a coastal supply route, are discussed in this chapter's Amphibious Warfare section.)